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The Supreme Court’s current attenuation doctrine for the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule has created a “firewall loophole” that police can use, even 
intentionally, to engage in illegal searches and seizures with immunity from 
suppression and most likely, without detection.  Up until now, my scholarship on 
digital privacy has focused on constitutional issues relating to the “fit” between 
modern technology and traditional legal doctrines including bulk data-mining 
programs like the National Security Agency (“NSA”)’s Prism program, taking the 
position that it is questionable whether they are unconstitutional under Smith v. 
Maryland.1  This Article seeks to answer two different but related questions: first, 
assuming that bulk digital surveillance does violate the Fourth Amendment, does it 
necessarily follow that its fruits must be suppressed and second, if the Fourth 
Amendment does not require their suppression, what role might Congress play in 
doing so?  In answering these questions, this Article makes a normative 
assumption, defended in my earlier Article, that pervasive-surveillance programs 
(“dragnets”) like Prism are undesirable and should be deterred.2 
 
II. SUPPRESSING “IDENTITY” 
 
A. Derivative Evidence 
 
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies not only to evidence 
derived directly from illegal investigation (“the primary illegality”), but also to 
secondary evidence (the “fruit of the poisonous tree”).  Textbook examples of this 
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the Constitutionalization of Inconvenience, 15 J. HIGH TECH. L. 260 (2015). 
2   See id. at 270. 
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include using an illegal wiretap to obtain a search warrant3 or inducing a 
confession by confronting a suspect with illegally obtained evidence.4 
While ordinarily the exclusionary rule requires suppression of these secondary 
forms of evidence, the Government can defeat its application by proving that the 
causal connection between the primary illegality and the subsequent evidence is 
sufficiently attenuated.5  This is a question of causation, the sufficiency of the 
nexus between the initial illegality and the evidence subsequently obtained. 
Increasingly, the Supreme Court or at least a majority of it, has been 
uncomfortable with and even hostile to the suppression of secondary evidence, 
drawing the attenuation line ever closer to the illegal police conduct and requiring 
a greater causal nexus between the illegal investigation and its subsequent fruits, 
particularly through the development of the independent-source and inevitable-
discovery doctrines.6  In Hudson v. Michigan,7 for example, the Court held that the 
exclusionary rule was inapplicable to “knock and announce” violations.  Justice 
Scalia, writing for the majority, reached this conclusion in part because he deemed 
there to be no causal connection between the unlawful entry (without knocking and 
announcing) and the resulting evidence.8  In doing so, he announced: 
 
                                                                                                                                          
3   See, e.g., Carter v. State, 337 A.2d 415 (Md. 1975) (holding that information garnered 
through an illegal wiretap could not be used to issue a search warrant). 
4   See, e.g., United States v. Timmann, 741 F.3d 1170 (11th Cir. 2013) (suppressing 
Timmann’s telephonic admissions because they were the direct result of agents exploiting evidence 
obtained from an illegal search); United States v. Cotton, 722 F.3d 271, 272 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(suppressing Cotton’s admissions “made immediately on the heels of the unlawful search and 
discovery of drugs”); United States v. $186,416.00 in U.S. Currency, 590 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(suppressing a suspect’s incriminating declaration of ownership of seized currency made in an 
application seeking its return because the seizure was the product of an illegal search); United States 
v. Davis, 323 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2003) (suppressing Davis’s admission that he possessed a shotgun 
as the fruit of the prior illegal search of his gym bag that led to the discovery of the gun); United 
States v. Nafzger, 965 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1992) (suppressing Nafzger’s admission that he knew that a 
truck was stolen when it was made immediately after agents discovered the truck in an illegal 
search); United States v. Parker, 722 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1983) (suppressing Parker’s statements five 
months after an illegal search because agents exploited the evidence illegally obtained in the search to 
induce it). 
5   See United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 72, n.3 (1998) (explaining that the exclusionary 
rule depended on a “sufficient causal relationship” between unlawful conduct and discovery of 
evidence); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–88 (1963) (defining attenuation as when 
evidence derived from a violation of the Fourth Amendment results from “means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint”); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340–41 
(1939) (holding that when discovery of secondary evidence occurs after the effect of the primary 
illegality became “attenuated,” the causal chain has been broken). 
6   See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (adopting the independent-source and inevitable-
discovery doctrines). 
7   547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
8   See id. at 592. 
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[E]xclusion may not be premised on the mere fact that a constitutional 
violation was a “but-for” cause of obtaining evidence.  Our cases show 
that but-for causality is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for 
suppression.  In this case, of course, the constitutional violation of an 
illegal manner of entry was not a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence.  
Whether that preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the police would 
have executed the warrant they had obtained, and would have discovered 
the gun and drugs inside the house.9 
 
B.  Illegal Arrests 
 
There is a line of cases dealing with the consequences of illegal arrests that 
later give rise to criminal charges, which are independent of, but related to, the 
attenuation doctrine.  If a suspect is arrested illegally (e.g., in the absence of 
probable cause) and searched incident to that arrest, the Fourth Amendment 
dictates that the fruits of that search be suppressed.10  Similarly, if a suspect is 
arrested illegally and as a direct result of that arrest makes incriminating 
statements, the Fourth Amendment dictates that those statements be suppressed.11  
If however, the illegal arrest does not directly result in any incriminating 
evidence—if the police for example, arrest a defendant before they have probable 
cause to do so, but later develop probable cause without relying on any fruits of the 
initial arrest—the defendant cannot “suppress” the prosecution.12 
The parameters of this doctrine are illustrated by a pair of cases: Davis v. 
Mississippi13 and United States v. Crews.14  In Davis, during a rape investigation, 
                                                                                                                                          
9   Id. 
10  See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (suppressing Davis’s fingerprints, 
taken during his illegal arrest, which “matched” fingerprints at the crime scene); Kremen v. United 
States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957) (suppressing evidence seized after Kremen’s illegal arrest). 
11  See Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). 
12  See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (holding that Payton’s indictment need not 
be dismissed even though his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Crews, 445 
U.S. 463 (1980) (holding that the illegality of Crews’s arrest did not require suppression of evidence 
untainted by police misconduct); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); see also Ker v. Illinois, 119 
U.S. 436 (1886) (holding that Ker could not challenge his conviction on the ground that he was 
illegally extradited from Peru for trial).  The only exception to this general rule is that a court can 
dismiss a prosecution under the Due Process Clause, if the Government engages in conduct so 
outrageous that it “shocks the conscience.”  See, e.g., United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507 
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (dismissing narcotics charges because the Government collaborated with 
Marshank’s attorney during his investigation and prosecution); cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 
(1952) (holding that forcibly pumping Rochin’s stomach to obtain morphine capsules for trial 
evidence so offended prevailing notions of fairness that it invalidated his conviction). 
13  394 U.S. 721 (1969) (holding that fingerprints taken during Davis’s illegal detention had to 
be suppressed). 
14  445 U.S. 463 (1980) (holding that a complaining witness’s in-court identification of Crews 
did not have to be suppressed as the fruit of his unlawful arrest). 
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the police conducted an illegal dragnet of young black men, taking their 
fingerprints for comparison to one left at the crime scene.  Davis’s fingerprint, 
taken during his illegal arrest, matched the crime-scene print.  When he moved to 
suppress his fingerprint as the fruit of his unlawful seizure, the Supreme Court 
agreed. 
In Crews, during an investigation of a string of robbery-assaults in women’s 
restrooms, Crews was arrested without probable cause, photographed, and 
released.  The police showed his arrest photo to a victim and she identified him as 
her assailant.  Prior to trial, the court suppressed the pretrial identification of 
Crews, but denied Crews’s motion to dismiss and permitted the victim to identify 
him at trial.  The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the in-court identification 
did not have to be suppressed because it was sufficiently attenuated from the 
illegal arrest and pretrial identification.  The Court also held that the denial of the 
motion to dismiss was proper because Crews’s identity was not the “fruit” of his 
unlawful arrest. 
A narrow reading of Crews suggests that the Court simply misunderstood the 
cognitive science surrounding eyewitness identification—i.e., that a subsequent 
identification can never be “independent” of a prior tainted one.15  A broader 
reading of Crews however, suggests the beginning of a doctrinal exception to the 
fruit-of-the-poisonous tree doctrine for evidence of “identity.” 
This doctrine governing the remedy (or lack thereof) for illegal arrests from 
which no trial evidence is derived arises in the context of the prompt-presentment 
requirement—or, more precisely, in the context of violations of the requirement.  
For example, in Gerstein v. Pugh,16 in which the Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment required that defendants arrested without a warrant or grand-jury 
indictment were entitled to a “prompt” judicial determination of probable cause, 
the Court reiterated that “illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent 
conviction.”17  Fifteen years later, in Riverside Co. v. McLaughlin,18 the Court 
defined “prompt,” adopting a presumptive forty-eight-hour rule.19  One practical 
effect of Pugh and McLaughlin has been that, while, doctrinally, probable cause is 
required prior to arrest, as a practical matter, it is not necessary that the State have 
probable cause until approximately forty-eight hours after arrest—i.e., that the 
police can “build” probable cause in the forty-eight hour period between a 
warrantless arrest and presentment of the suspect without consequence, because 
                                                                                                                                          
15  See Kathryn Segovia, et al., Virtual Human Identification Line-ups, in CRANIOFACIAL 
IDENTIFICATION 101 (Caroline Wilkinson et al. eds., 2012) (discussing accuracy concerns with 
eyewitness-identification procedures). 
16  420 U.S. 103 (1975) (holding unconstitutional procedures under which suspects arrested 
without a warrant could remain in custody for thirty days or more without a judicial determination of 
probable cause). 
17  Id. at 119. 
18  500 U.S. 44 (1991). 
19  See id. at 56. 
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the premature arrest does not result in a dismissal, only suppression of evidence 
obtained as a result of the period of delay.  Typically, this evidence caused is 
limited to two classes: (1) the defendant’s confession, if there is one and if it 
occurred during the period of unreasonable delay;20 and (2) evidence relating to the 
defendant’s “identity,” which generally means fingerprints (and resulting criminal-
history information, if any). 
 
C.  Identification of Suspects 
 
One result of the expansion of the concept of attenuation, in conjunction with 
these cases holding that dismissal is not the consequence of illegal arrest, has 
emerged in the context of illegal arrests that result in the identification of suspects, 
the constitutional consequences of which have befuddled judges ever since the 
Supreme Court penned the following sentence in I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza:21 “The 
‘body’ or identity of a defendant . . . in a criminal . . .  proceeding is never itself 
suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful 
arrest, search, or interrogation occurred.”22  Lopez involved two Mexican citizens 
caught up in putatively illegal arrests by the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (“INS”).  During their arrests, they admitted to being undocumented.  The 
INS used their admissions in their subsequent deportation hearings, over their 
objections.  On appeal, the Court reached two holdings.  The primary one was that 
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule did not apply in civil deportation 
hearings.  The secondary one was somewhat more cryptic.  The Court held that the 
illegality of the arrests was irrelevant to the subsequent deportation hearings.  It is 
in the context of this second holding that the Court penned the cryptic sentence 
above. 
Post-Lopez, the question arises: what if an illegal arrest leads to the discovery 
of a suspect’s fingerprints, which then leads to the discovery of other evidence—
for example, the suspect’s immigration file or criminal history—to be used at trial?  
A narrow reading of the second holding of Lopez would be consistent with earlier 
cases like Payton v. New York23 and Crews, standing merely for the 
uncontroversial proposition that the illegality of an arrest does not deprive a court 
of jurisdiction over a subsequent criminal charge, and would not bar suppression of 
this evidence.  Relying on a broader reading of Lopez however, some federal 
circuits refuse to suppress the discovery not only of a defendant’s “identity,” but 
                                                                                                                                          
20  See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1968) (providing that a confession made while a defendant is 
“under arrest or other detention in the custody of any law-enforcement officer or law-enforcement 
agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person before [a judicial 
officer]” if it was made voluntarily and “within six hours” following arrest). 
21  468 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
22  Id. at 1039. 
23  445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
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also of evidence related to it, usually fingerprints, even when it is the “fruit” of the 
illegal arrest.24 
For example, in United States v. Navarro-Diaz,25 Navarro was illegally arrested 
during a drug bust and provided a fake identity card.  The search conducted 
incident to his arrest turned up his real identity card.  When the police confronted 
Navarro with the real card, he admitted that it was his and that the name and date 
of birth were accurate.  Navarro’s real name and birthdate led agents to his 
immigration file, and the Government charged him with returning to the United 
States illegally after a previous deportation.26  Navarro moved to suppress the 
evidence of his “identity” as fruits of his illegal detention.  On appeal, the Sixth 
Circuit upheld the denial of his motion because “identity cannot be suppressed” 
under Lopez.27 
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar result in United States v. Del Toro 
Gudino.28  Del Toro was stopped illegally and gave agents a fake name and date of 
birth.  When they confronted him with the fact that they could not find an 
immigration file associated with the identity that he had given, he admitted to 
being undocumented.  The fingerprints and photograph taken during his arrest led 
agents to his immigration file, which showed that he had previously been removed 
from the United States.  When the Government charged him with illegally 
returning after that prior removal, he moved to suppress his fingerprints, 
photograph, and statements about his “identity” as fruits of his illegal arrest.  On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress, reasoning 
that under Lopez, when an illegal arrest led only to the disclosure of a defendant’s 
“identity,” evidence of that identity could not be suppressed.29 
Other circuits have limited the holding in Lopez to challenges to a court’s 
jurisdiction over a defendant, rather than more broadly prohibiting the suppression 
                                                                                                                                          
24  See United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 420 F.3d 581, 588 (6th Cir. 2005) (interpreting Lopez as 
barring suppression of evidence of Navarro’s “identity” stemming from his illegal arrest); United 
States v. Bowley, 435 F.3d 426, 430–31 (3d Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Roque-Villanueva, 
175 F.3d 345, 346 (5th Cir. 1999) (same). 
25  420 F.3d 581. 
26  See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1947) (criminalizing an alien’s being “found in” the United States 
subsequent to a prior “removal”). 
27  Navarro-Diaz, 420 F.3d at 588. 
28  376 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 2004). 
29  See id. at 1000–01. 
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of derivative evidence of identity.30  Not to be outdone, the Ninth Circuit has 
issued reported opinions subscribing to both sides of the debate.31   
Even in the circuits that read Lopez narrowly and suppress fingerprints and 
documentary evidence discovered as a result of illegal arrests, suppression of the 
derivative evidence would not prevent the Government from obtaining this 
evidence from an independent source by fingerprinting the defendant again, 
assuming that it had probable cause to do so without the suppressed evidence.  
This would simply be the application of Crews to fingerprints and/or the answer to 
the question not addressed in Davis (whether Mississippi could have 
refingerprinted him if it had probable cause, independent of the prior arrest).  Even 
if the Government lacked probable cause for new prints, it could follow a 
defendant out of the courtroom and conduct the considerable surveillance available 
to it without probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or a warrant.  The combination 
of Whren v. United States32 and Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,33 standing alone, 
almost guarantees that police can fingerprint any suspect if they want to.  They just 
need to wait until their suspect rolls a stop sign or fails to signal a lane change. 
 
III. THE FIREWALL DILEMMA: 
 
A.  Thought Experiment 
 
These suppression-of-“identity” cases typically arise in the context of 
immigration prosecutions, but there is nothing doctrinally cabining them there.  
When placed in the context of national security and bulk high-tech surveillance, 
they give rise to an interesting thought experiment. 
                                                                                                                                          
30  See United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that Lopez 
did not bar suppression of Olivares-Rangel’s “identity” stemming from his illegal arrest); United 
States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 754 (8th Cir. 2001) (upholding suppression of Guevara-
Martinez’s fingerprints, obtained after his illegal arrest and interpreting Lopez to refer only to 
jurisdictional challenges). 
31  Compare Del Toro Gudino, 376 F.3d at 1001 (“[W]ho a defendant is cannot be excluded, 
regardless of the nature of the violation leading to his identity.”), and United States v. Orozco-Rico, 
589 F.2d 433, 435 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[T]here is no sanction to be applied when an illegal arrest only 
leads to discovery of the man's identity and that merely leads to the official file or other independent 
evidence.” (quoting Hoonsilapa v. INS, 575F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1978))), with United States v. 
Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 940 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that neither the “insuppressible nature of 
identity evidence” nor the inevitable-discovery doctrine justified the admission of identity documents 
obtained during Manzo’s suspicionless stop); United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 389 F.3d 864, 867–68 
(9th Cir. 2004) (holding that Lopez did not bar suppression of evidence of Garcia-Beltran’s “identity” 
stemming from his illegal arrest). 
32  517 U.S. 806 (1996) (upholding pretextual traffic stops as long as officers could articulate 
probable cause for some offense). 
33  532 U.S. 318 (2001) (holding that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit warrantless 
arrests for any offense, no matter how minor). 
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First, imagine that an agency like the NSA is engaging in patently 
unconstitutional surveillance: in addition to tracking the metadata of Americans’ 
telephone and e-mail communications, monitoring their Internet usage (check-ins, 
geo-tagged photographs, tweets, and movie-viewing histories on Google, 
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Netflix), and collecting and analyzing 
commercial and governmental data (travel records, credit card transactions, 
insurance information, passenger manifests, voter registration rolls, and tax data), 
it is also listening to the contents of all phone conversations,34 reading the full text 
of all e-mails35 and text messages, and monitoring lawyers and journalists, all 
without individualized suspicion or court authorization (search warrants, FISC 
orders), in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Second, imagine that the NSA does not share either the course or the results 
of its surveillance with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”).  Instead, a 
“firewall” is built between the two agencies.  When the NSA illegally intercepts 
and analyzes information, concluding that an individual is participating or about to 
participate in a serious crime, the only piece of information that it shares over the 
firewall is the suspect’s name.  “Pssst, you should check out Carrie Leonetti.”  
(Please don’t.) 
Third, imagine that the FBI takes only the name of the suspect generated by 
the NSA and begins legal surveillance of that person, which, under the Court’s 
current jurisprudence, could be quite extensive even without probable cause or a 
search warrant.  The FBI attaches a pen register to the suspect’s phone(s),36 
collects metadata from electronic communications,37 “pings” the suspect’s phone38 
or obtains tower location information from his/her cell company,39 follows the 
suspect on public roads40 or from the air41 observing everything that s/he does in 
                                                                                                                                          
34  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (reversing Katz’s conviction for 
transmitting wagering information over the telephone because the police obtained the evidence to 
convict him by electronically eavesdropping without a warrant, on the pay phone that he used). 
35  See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment applied to e-mails sent through commercial internet service providers). 
36  See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–46 (1979) (holding that Smith lacked a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers that he dialed from his home telephone). 
37  See Leonetti, supra note 1. 
38  See United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 778 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that “pinging” 
Skinner’s cell phone did not infringe on his reasonable expectation of privacy in his location). 
39  While police frequently obtain phone location data from telecommunication companies 
without a warrant and occasionally use cell-phone “scanners” to search phone data surreptitiously 
during traffic stops, the few lower courts to weigh in have been divided over the constitutionality of 
the practices.  Compare In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that the Government did 
not need a warrant to require a cellular service provider to produce customer location history), with 
State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 631 (N.J. 2013) (holding that the New Jersey Constitution required the 
police to get a warrant before obtaining cell-location information). 
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“plain view,” seizes the suspect’s garbage after it is left out for collection,42 picks 
up “abandoned” DNA, fingerprints, etc.,43 goes to the suspect’s home and performs 
a “knock and talk,” asking the suspect questions, observing at least the entryway of 
the suspect’s home, and asking the suspect to consent to searches,44 engages in a 
noncustodial interrogation of the suspect.45  Based on these legal warrantless forms 
of investigation, the FBI develops probable cause “independent” of the NSA’s 
illegal surveillance, which then provides the justification for warrants to search 
premises and seize evidence, for biological evidence,46 wiretaps,47 and thermal 
imaging of the suspect’s home48 or for arrest and custodial interrogation, all of 
which gives rise to the probable cause required to prosecute (and the proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt to convict) the suspect. 
                                                                                                                                          
40  See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (holding that a person “traveling in 
an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements 
from one place to another.”).  Justice Alito explained the distinction between live surveillance and 
GPS tracking during the oral arguments in United States v. Jones.  See Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 10, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 5360051, at *10. 
41  See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–15 (1986) (holding that Ciraolo’s backyard 
marijuana garden was in plain view when officers spotted it from a helicopter 1,000 feet overhead); 
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 240 (1986) (holding that enhanced visual 
surveillance via aerial photographs from navigable airspace was not a search). 
42  See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding that Greenwood had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the trash left at her curb for city collection). 
43  See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (upholding the constitutionality of 
warrantless DNA collection upon arrest for violent felonies); People v. Thomas, 200 Cal. App. 4th 
338 (Dist. Ct. App. 2d. 2011) (holding that Thomas abandoned any privacy interest in his DNA when 
he failed to wipe his saliva off of a breath-test device); People v. Gallego, 190 Cal. App. 4th 388, 396 
(Dist. Ct. App. 3d. 2010) (The “cigarette butt, like the trash bags in Greenwood, was left in a place 
‘particularly suited for public inspection.’  Defendant thus abandoned the cigarette butt in a public 
place, and therefore had no reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the DNA testing of it to 
identify him as a suspect.”); Williamson v. State, 413 Md. 521 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that the 
Fourth Amendment did not apply to the warrantless collection of DNA from a cup that Williamson 
abandoned on the floor of his holding cell); State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 37 (Wash. 2007) (“Police 
may surreptitiously follow a suspect to collect DNA, fingerprints, footprints, or other possibly 
incriminating evidence, without violating that suspect’s privacy.”). 
44  See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982) (holding that an officer lawfully in a 
student’s room could seize marijuana seeds and a pipe in plain view). 
45  See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (holding that encounters in which a reasonable 
person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his/her business were consensual and did 
not need reasonable suspicion). 
46  See Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment applied to breath and urine tests); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) 
(holding that the Fourth Amendment applied to “searches involving intrusions beyond the body’s 
surface”). 
47  See 18 U.S.C. § 2510, (2010) (prohibiting the interception, disclosure, and use as evidence 
of oral, wire, and electronic communications without a court order); 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2010) 
(prohibiting the use of pen-register or trap-and-trace devices without a court order). 
48  See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that thermal imaging into a 
home was a search, even though it did not involve a “physical intrusion”). 
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IV. INADEQUACY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY REMEDY 
 
Finally, imagine that the suspect, now defendant, moves to suppress the 
evidence that the FBI has amassed on the ground that it was derived from the 
NSA’s earlier illegal surveillance.  Under Lopez and Payton, the motion would be 
denied, and the denial would be affirmed on appeal.  In the terminology of current 
exclusionary-rule jurisprudence, the causal chain between the primary illegality 
(the NSA’s secret surveillance) and the derivative evidence (from the FBI’s legal 
investigation) would be sufficiently “attenuated,” even though the FBI would 
never have focused on the suspect without the name from the NSA. 
The problem is not that the Fourth Amendment would not prohibit the NSA’s 
illegal surveillance; the problem is that the exclusionary rule, as the Court 
understands it, would not be an adequate remedy for it.  Even though the Court’s 
recent decisions in United States v. Jones49 (GPS tracking), Florida v. Jardines50 
(dog sniffs), and Riley v. California51 (cellular data) are promising in terms of its 
willingness to expand Fourth Amendment protections along with expansions of 
high-tech surveillance capabilities, those cases do not change the exclusionary-rule 
calculus.  As long as none of the evidence gathered by the NSA is used against the 
defendant at trial (which is unnecessary once the FBI’s “independent” legal 
investigation generates its own evidence), the defendant has no remedy, at least in 
the criminal case, for the violation.52 
In fact, the NSA’s illegal surveillance in the hypothetical scenario would 
likely go undetected, except perhaps for a nagging question about why the FBI 
began to focus on the defendant in the first instance, a question that frequently 
goes unanswered even in criminal cases in which the investigation begins legally 
(e.g., because of information from a confidential informant).  In federal court, there 
are two primary sources of defense discovery: Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and Due Process.  In national-security cases, the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”)53 also grants the defendant the right to 
disclosure of certain electronic surveillance. 
Rule 16 requires the Government to disclose the defendant’s statements, 
criminal record, and certain objects that it intends to introduce at trial.54  Since the 
                                                                                                                                          
49  132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that installing a GPS device on Jones’s vehicle and 
monitoring its public movements without a valid warrant constituted a search). 
50  133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013). 
51  134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (holding that a valid search incident to arrest did not extend to a 
suspect’s phone data). 
52  See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (refusing to permit Sibron to raise a facial 
challenge to the constitutionality of New York's stop-and-frisk law). 
53  50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1978). 
54  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (a). 
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results of the secret NSA spying in the hypothetical scenario are, by definition, 
secret and unintended for use at trial, Rule 16 would confer no right of disclosure. 
Brady v. Maryland and its progeny require the Government to disclose 
evidence that may be favorable to the defense,55 including evidence in the 
possession of investigating law-enforcement agencies.56  Evidence is “favorable” if 
it tends to demonstrate innocence, mitigate sentence, or undercut the credibility of 
prosecution witnesses (e.g., evidence that a witness received or expected 
consideration in exchange for testimony or was dishonest on a prior occasion).57  
Returning to the hypothetical scenario, it is hard to imagine how anything that the 
illegal NSA investigation revealed would meet these definitions.  On the contrary, 
the results of the secret, illegal investigation would likely be more damning to the 
defendant.  Evidence may also be favorable if it tends to support a pretrial motion, 
such as a motion to suppress the fruits of an illegal search.  Because there is no 
exclusionary remedy for illegal investigations that do not result in trial evidence 
(but rather merely result in the identification of a suspect) the defendant would not 
be entitled to disclosure of the illegal investigation on this ground, either.58 
Recent national-security cases exemplify these discovery obstacles.  In United 
States v. Moalin,59 the Government charged Moalin with providing material 
support to terrorists and related offenses.60  Moalin moved to suppress wiretap 
evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant.61  The motion challenged the 
Government's use of electronic surveillance pursuant to Title I of FISA62 and the 
FISA Amendments Act.63 Moalin requested that his attorney, who possessed the 
appropriate security clearances, be granted access to the FISA warrant applications 
                                                                                                                                          
55  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“[S]uppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material 
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). 
56  See Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869–70 (2006) (explaining that Brady 
applies to any evidence known to police investigators, even if the prosecutor is not aware of the 
existence of the evidence, because prosecutors have a duty to discover any favorable evidence known 
to others acting on their behalf); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (explaining that 
prosecutors have a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on their behalf in 
the case, including the police). 
57  See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 
(1972) (clarifying that “favorable” evidence included evidence that tended to impeach prosecution 
witnesses). 
58  See Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972) (“We know of no constitutional 
requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police 
investigatory work on a case.”). 
59  No. 10cr4246 JM., 2013 WL 6079518 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013) (holding that the NSA’s 
warrantless collection of international “telephony metadata” was legal because Moalin lacked a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in it). 
60  See id. at *1. 
61  See id. 
62  50 U.S.C. § 1806 (1978). 
63  50 U.S.C. § 1881 (2008). 
222 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 13:1 
and pertinent orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court [FISC], arguing 
that the electronic surveillance was obtained in violation of FISA and the First and 
Fourth Amendments and seeking disclosure pursuant to Brady and Rule 16.64  In 
the alternative, Moalin requested that the court perform an in camera review of the 
documents, pursuant to the Classified Information Procedures Act.65  The Court 
rejected Moalin’s discovery request and denied his motion to suppress because it 
found that he did not have a colorable Fourth Amendment challenge to the 
surveillance that would render disclosure favorable to the defense.66 
In United States v. Mohamud, the Portland “Christmas Tree Bomber” was 
convicted of attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction.67  At Mohamud’s 
initial appearance, the Government provided notice that it intended to use evidence 
obtained under FISA.68  Prior to trial, Mohamud moved to suppress information 
seized from his computer and cell phone.69  He also moved for disclosure of the 
details of the FISA searches.70  Almost a year after Mohamud’s trial, the 
Government filed a Supplemental FISA Notification, notifying Mohamud: 
 
“This supplemental notice is being filed as a result of the government's 
determination that information obtained or derived from Title I FISA 
collection [domestic electronic surveillance] may, in particular cases, 
also be “derived from” prior Title VII FISA collection [foreign 
intelligence gathering]. . . . [T]he United States hereby provides notice . . 
. that the government has offered into evidence or otherwise used or 
disclosed in proceedings, including at trial, in the above-captioned matter 
information derived from acquisition of foreign intelligence information . 
. . .”71 
 
In other words, Mohamud’s communications with foreign intelligence targets 
abroad had been incidentally intercepted during the NSA’s surveillance of them, 
the discovery of those communications made Mohamud the subject of domestic 
surveillance through analysis of his telephone metadata, and the metadata 
collection (in conjunction with the foreign communications) led to the FBI sting 
operation, which produced the evidence used at trial. 
                                                                                                                                          
64  See Moalin, 2013 WL 6079518, at *1. 
65  18 U.S.C. app. §§ 3, 4 (1980).  See Moalin, 2013 WL 6079518, at *2. 
66  See Moalin, 2013 WL 6079518, at *9. 
67  See United States v. Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, 2014 WL 2866749, at *1 (D. Or. 
June 24, 2014). 
68  See id. 
69  See United States v. Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, 2012 WL 5208173, at *1 (D. Or. 
Oct. 22, 2012). 
70  See United States v. Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, 2012 WL 4594746 (D. Or. Oct. 
2, 2012). 
71  Mohamud, 2014 WL 2866749, at *1. 
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When Mohamud, who had not yet been sentenced, received the supplemental 
notification, he challenged the constitutionality of the foreign intelligence 
gathering (the incidental collection of his communications during the surveillance 
of foreign targets) and what he presumed to have been (but was not disclosed as) 
his telephone-metadata collection under the Patriot Act,72 from which the other 
evidence against him had been “derived,” and requested discovery relating to the 
surveillance.73  The court denied Mohamud’s motion for discovery, as well as his 
motion to suppress the FISA evidence and its “fruits,”74 reasoning: “[S]urveillance 
is not evidence—it produces evidence.”75 
In United States v. Daoud,76 the Government charged Daoud with attempting 
to use a weapon of mass destruction and related offenses.77  The indictment arose 
out of an FBI investigation after Daoud joined an e-mail conversation with two 
undercover FBI agents and discussed using explosives while engaging in “violent 
jihad,” which led the agents to obtain surveillance warrants.78  Daoud ultimately 
attempted to detonate a fake bomb, given to him by undercover agents, in 
downtown Chicago.79 
Prior to trial, the Government notified Daoud that it intended to present 
evidence derived from electronic surveillance conducted under FISA.80  Daoud 
moved for disclosure of the classified materials submitted in support of the 
government's FISA warrant applications to his attorneys, who held appropriate 
security clearances, in order to support a motion for a hearing under Franks v. 
Delaware,81 to suppress the evidence obtained in violation of FISA.82  The court 
granted the motion after an in camera review of the materials.  On appeal, the 
Seventh Circuit reversed the order, holding that Daoud was not entitled to the 
FISA application to make his preliminary showing that it contained false 
statements by the agents who prepared it and holding, on the merits of the motion 
to suppress, that the investigation did not violate FISA.83  Judge Rovner, in dissent, 
noted the somewhat perverse implications of this ruling:  
 
                                                                                                                                          
72  50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2001). 
73  See Mohamud, 2014 WL 2866749, at *2, *14. 
74  Id. at *2. 
75  Id. at *6. 
76  755 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2014). 
77  See id. at 480. 
78  Id.  
79  See id. 
80  See id. 
81  438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978) (holding that Franks could challenge a search conducted 
pursuant to a warrant if it was procured by a knowing or reckless falsehood). 
82  See Daoud, 755 F.3d at 480–82. 
83  See id. at 484. 
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“[N]otwithstanding the presumed applicability of Franks to the FISA 
framework, defendants in FISA cases face an obvious and virtually 
insurmountable obstacle in the requirement that they make a substantial 
preliminary showing of deliberate or reckless material falsehoods or 
omissions in the FISA application without having access to the 
application itself.”84 
 
V. AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY 
 
A. Congress to the Rescue? 
 
There are several ways that the Court could close the firewall loophole, if it 
were so inclined.  One way would be to tighten the attenuation doctrine, replacing 
its proximate causation with but-for causation.  The hypothetical consequence 
would be recognition of a direct and unbreakable line between the NSA’s 
“discovery” of a suspect and the Government’s prosecution of the same 
defendant,85 but it is hard to imagine how the Court could cabin this change in the 
exclusionary rule solely in the firewall situation.  A more sweeping doctrinal 
reform to the exclusionary rule, one not limited to the NSA hypothetical, seems 
unlikely in light of the Court’s hostility to the concept of “tainted” evidence.86 
Another possibility would be for the Court to carve out an exception to the 
attenuation and independent-source doctrines for digital or bulk surveillance, but 
these distinctions would also be doctrinally problematic.  It is difficult to imagine a 
principled distinction between evidence derived from somewhat distant electronic 
surveillance and evidence derived from other forms of attenuated illegal 
investigations vis a vis the application of the exclusionary remedy.  With regard to 
the bulk nature of the hypothetical surveillance, the Court has already rejected 
arguments that other forms of bulk surveillance (the “knock and talk”87 random 
urine testing88 roadblocks,89 border searches,90 searches in correctional facilities,91 
                                                                                                                                          
84  Id. at 490 (Rovner, J., dissenting). 
85  Re made a somewhat similar proposal advocating suppression based on due process.  See 
Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885 (2014). 
86  See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (asserting that the 
exclusionary rule imposed too high a price upon truth seeking); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 
338, 349–50 (1974) (describing the exclusionary rule’s costs). 
87  See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011) (holding that “knock and talks” were 
not searches because police were not doing “more than any private citizen might do”). 
88  See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (holding that drug testing students who 
participated in extracurricular activities did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was 
designed to prevent drug use); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) 
(upholding random urinalysis for student athletes because it was undertaken to protect children); 
Nat’l Treasury Emps. v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding random drug testing of customs 
officers because the purpose was to ensure their fitness to handle firearms and interdict drugs). 
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and DNA databases92) are unconstitutional, let alone warrant special application of 
the exclusionary rule.  On the contrary, in these cases, the existence of “special 
needs” and a “programmatic purpose” (rather than individualized suspicion) made 
them more, rather than less, palatable to the Court.93 
A third option would be for the Court to carve out separate treatment for 
intentional violations of the Fourth Amendment and refuse to apply the attenuation 
doctrine to them, but doing so would be inconsistent with the Court’s prior cases 
holding that the subjective intent of the police does not render an otherwise valid 
search or seizure unreasonable.94  Conversely, however, the Court has ruled, in a 
variety of contexts, that the subjective intent of the police can render a warrantless 
search reasonable or the exclusionary rule inapplicable.95  In other words, while 
                                                                                                                                          
89  See Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding drunk-driving 
checkpoints); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (upholding automobile 
checkpoints for illegal immigrants and contraband). 
90  See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004) (holding that disassembly of a 
car’s gas tank at the border did not require individualized suspicion); United States v. Montoya de 
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (upholding routine searches and seizures at the border without 
probable cause or a warrant to collect duties and prevent introduction of contraband); United States v. 
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (recognizing the “border search” exception to the Fourth Amendment). 
91  See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (holding that invasive 
strip searches of misdemeanor pretrial detainees without probable cause did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment because the purpose was to detect and deter possession of contraband in jail). 
92  See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1972 (2013) (holding that collecting and searching 
DNA profiles in a database was not a search). 
93  Cf. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (holding that a hospital’s policy of 
testing pregnant patients’ for drugs violated the Fourth Amendment because its purpose was to obtain 
evidence of cocaine use and report it to police). 
94  See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 807 (holding that officers’ motives, 
“whatever the subjective intent,” were not relevant to a determination of probable cause or 
reasonableness); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (declining to require that the discovery of 
incriminating evidence by police be inadvertent in order for the plain-view exception to the warrant 
requirement to apply). But see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (holding that the 
city’s warrantless drug interdiction checkpoints violated the Fourth Amendment in part because their 
purpose was crime control). 
95  See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (holding that the exclusionary rule 
did not apply to searches conducted in reasonable good-faith reliance on binding precedent 
subsequently overruled); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (holding that the exclusionary 
rule did not apply to evidence obtained as the result of a negligent but unintentional bookkeeping 
error by the police); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (holding that evidence seized in violation of 
Fourth Amendment as result of clerical errors of court employees fell within the good-faith exception 
to exclusionary rule); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
permitted officers to conduct a warrantless protective sweep of a home during an arrest as long as it 
was conducted with the good-faith non-investigative purpose of ensuring officer safety); Colorado v. 
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (holding that warrantless inventory searches of automobiles 
administered in good faith satisfied the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
(1984) (recognizing the “good-faith exception” to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and 
holding that the rule did not apply to evidence obtained by officers in good-faith reliance on a search 
warrant later found to be invalid); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (holding that the 
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good faith often inures to the benefit of a search, seizure, or subsequent use of 
derivative evidence, bad faith rarely inures to their detriment. 
The only remaining remedy therefore, is a legislative one, targeted not at the 
attenuation doctrine in its entirety, but rather at a subset—the illegal surveillance 
of suspects that results in no direct evidence at trial.  Unlike the Supreme Court, 
which must be wary of the future implications of its precedents,96 Congress is free 
to adopt a statutory remedy irrelevant of doctrinal or intellectual consistency with 
the remainder of the Court’s jurisprudence.  Through a legislative remedy, 
Congress could decide the appropriate limits on bulk surveillance as a matter of 
policy, rather than relying on the courts, through constitutional analysis, to do so.  
Congress has the power, in this context: first, to adopt an exclusionary remedy for 
intentionally illegal investigations (or even high-tech bulk surveillance in its 
entirety) that does not require proximate cause between the illegality and evidence 
derived from it but instead has a temporal or but-for nexus or a subject-matter 
trigger; and, second, to enact a statutory discovery mechanism requiring the 
Government to reveal the results of any investigation that led to the defendant 
becoming a suspect, irrelevant of whether it intends to use those results at trial or 
whether they are favorable to the defense.   
There has been a longstanding debate among jurisprudence scholars and 
political scientists about the relative effectiveness and appropriateness of courts 
versus legislatures in furthering social and political change.97  In the context of 
                                                                                                                                          
warrantless inventory search of Opperman’s impounded automobile was not an “unreasonable” 
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment as long as the officers conducted it in the good-faith 
absence of an investigatory motive). 
96  See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) (“[A] decision to overrule 
should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly 
decided.”); Vasquez v. Hillery, 417 U.S. 254, 268 (1986) (explaining the importance of adhering to 
precedent); see also Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) 
(explaining that the obligation to precedent has special force when it has given rise to settled 
expectations). 
97  The original protagonist in the debate was Gerald Rosenberg.  See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, 
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2nd ed.1991) (arguing that the 
nature of constitutional rights is limited, courts are fundamentally conservative, and they lack tools to 
enforce decisions that are out of step with social mores); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Hollow Hopes and 
Other Aspirations: A Reply to Feeley and McCann, 17 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 761, 776 (1992); see also 
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in A Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 
50 EMORY L. J. 563, 578 (2001) (“[I]t would appear on political grounds, somewhat unrealistic to 
suppose that a Court whose members are recruited in the fashion of Supreme Court Justices would 
long hold to norms of Right or Justice substantially at odds with the rest of the political elite.”); Mark 
A. Graber, Resolving Political Questions into Judicial Questions: Tocqueville’s Thesis Revisited, 21 
CONST. COMMENTARY 485 (2004) (describing the limited ability of courts to resolve political issues 
through constitutional adjudication); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 
115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1376–86 (2006) (arguing that there are “important outcome-related defects in 
the way [that] courts approach rights”).  Other scholars have taken the opposite position.  See, e.g., 
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA (2006); see 
also GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS: STATUTORY AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL POWER, AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2003) (arguing that courts step into the breach intentionally left to them by 
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high-tech surveillance, however, a legislative solution is not unprecedented.  The 
two actions proposed in this Article (a statutory exclusionary remedy for illegal 
dragnets and a discovery mechanism) are analogous to prior actions that Congress 
has taken with respect to wiretapping and FISA. 
In 1934, Congress acted to reign in wiretapping excesses, spurred largely by 
Prohibition and organized-crime investigations, with a limited federal statute.98  
After the Supreme Court failed to adopt a more sweeping constitutional remedy in 
Berger v. New York,99 Congress crafted the Wiretap Act, a more comprehensive 
statutory scheme regulating wiretapping.100  In 1968, Congress enacted the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”),101 updating and reorganizing 
the Wiretap Act, because of concerns with new technologies.102 
In 1975, Congress organized the Senate Select Committee to Study 
Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities (the “Church 
Committee”) to investigate Government intelligence gathering.103  The Church 
Committee concluded that the Executive Branch had engaged in widespread 
surveillance of citizens and that Congress needed to reign in foreign intelligence 
gathering.104  As a result, in 1978, Congress enacted FISA, requiring the 
Government to obtain court orders from the FISC for certain foreign intelligence 
activities.105 
While typically the political branches of government have been more hostile 
to constitutional rights protecting criminal defendants than the judiciary,106 high-
                                                                                                                                          
legislatures’ vague statutory enactments); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARD JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004) (advocating judicial constitutional 
interpretation to resolve difficult policy issues). 
98  See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47 U.S.C § 605 
(1996)) (excluding wiretap evidence from federal criminal trials). 
99 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (reviewing New York’s wiretap statute, N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-a, 
and holding it to be unconstitutional on narrow grounds). 
100 See Title III § 802 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 
90-315, 82 Stat. 197 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (2013)). 
101 Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 
U.S.C.). 
102 See Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A 
Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 
1557–58 (2004).  
103 See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 793 (2d Cir. 2015). 
104 See id. 
105 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 (1978)). 
106 See KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY 
AMERICAN POLITICS (1997); ELLIOTT CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 6–7 (2013) 
(describing the tendency of policymakers to fixate on increasing punishment as their sole criminal-
justice remedy); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF LAW AND ORDER: STREET CRIME AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 71 (Malcolm M. Feeley et al. eds.,1984) (describing how politics drive punitive 
political discourse and policies); William Lyons & Stuart Scheingold, The Politics of Crime and 
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tech bulk surveillance seems to be one area in which Congress has demonstrated 
sufficient recent outrage, interest, and willingness to support privacy protections.  
Ric Simmons has described this “rise of Congress” in ensuring privacy against 
encroachment by new surveillance technologies.107 
In 2012, the Senate Judiciary Committee passed the ECPA Amendments Act, 
which would have strengthened privacy protections for e-mail communications by 
amending the ECPA to require a warrant based on probable cause to access 
electronic communications, like text messages, e-mails, and other private 
documents in individual electronic accounts.108  More recently, a bipartisan group 
of Senators proposed the USA Freedom Act109 in response to Edward Snowden’s 
disclosures in June 2013 about the NSA’s bulk-surveillance programs.110  The Act 
would prohibit bulk collection of Americans’ communications without a court 
order and permit telecommunications companies to report publicly their 
participation in surveillance programs.  The Act was intended to rein in dragnet 
data collection, increase Congressional oversight of the FISC, permit third parties 
to release information regarding FISA requests, and create an independent 
constitutional advocate to argue before the FISC.111  In May 2014, the House 
passed the Act.112 Similar legislation was introduced in the Senate in August,113 
and was narrowly defeated in November, with fifty-eight votes in favor.114 
These bills would restrict some of the bulk surveillance that may be permitted 
by the Fourth Amendment, but they do not create an exclusionary rule for their 
violation nor do they otherwise address the question that this Article raises: what if 
                                                                                                                                          
Punishment, 1 CRIM. JUST. 103, 114 (2000) (describing the punitive nature of the “malign neglect” 
politics of crime control); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery 
and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 843–57 (1991) (questioning the ability of 
legislatures appropriately to promulgate procedural-justice rules); Michael Tonry & David P. 
Harrington, Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention, in BUILDING A SAFER SOCIETY: STRATEGIC 
APPROACHES TO CRIME PREVENTION (Michael Tonry & David S. Harrington, eds. 1995); see also 
Robert Sampson & Dawn Jeglum Bartusch, Legal Cynicism and (Subcultural?) Tolerance of 
Deviance: The Neighborhood Context of Racial Differences, 32 L. & SOC’Y REV., 777 (1998) 
(describing how social policies drive increasingly intense surveillance). 
107 Ric Simmons, The New Reality of Search Analysis: Four Trends Created by New 
Surveillance Technologies, 81 MISS. L. J. 991, 995–99 (2012). 
108 See Charlie Savage, Panel Approves a Bill to Safeguard E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES Nov. 30, 
2012, at B7. 
109 See H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013) (expanding the definition of “tangible things” in 
FISA Section 215 to include “call detail records,” restricting the interception of Americans’ 
communications with foreign targets, and reforming FISC and the use of National Security Letters). 
110 See Charlie Savage & Jeremy W. Peters, Bill to Restrict N.S.A. Data Collection Blocked in 
Vote by Senate Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, November 19, 2014, at A1. 
111 See H.R. 3361 113th Cong. § 1 (2013). 
112 See Jennifer Granick & Christopher Sprigman, The Criminal N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES June 27, 
2013, http://nytimes.com/2013/06/28/opinion/the-criminal-nsa.html. 
113 See S.B. 2685 113th Cong. (2013). 
114 See Savage & Peters, supra note 110,. 
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the NSA does it anyway?  The question that remains for legislation, therefore, is 
how to close the firewall loophole.  In the context of patently illegal surveillance 
and the attenuation doctrine, the greater need is for a remedy rather than 
recognition of the right in the first instance, a legislative exclusionary rule for all 
evidence derived, directly or indirectly, from illegal surveillance, irrelevant of the 
constitutional concepts of taint and attenuation.  The key is to exclude the results 
of illegal surveillance, even when those results are merely the identification of a 
suspect for subsequent investigation.  This exclusionary rule must ask whether, but 
for the primary illegality (the NSA’s illegal spying), the derivative evidence would 
have been found (the FBI would have focused on the defendant), in contrast to the 
constitutional exclusionary rule whose effectiveness against derivative evidence of 
identity founders against the proximate cause requirement.115  This rule could be 
limited and unwanted consequences prevented if, unlike Fourth Amendment 
doctrine,116 it also took into consideration the intentionality of illegal surveillance: 
the but-for test for causation kicks in when an agency engages in surveillance that 




Of course, determining the effectiveness of any “remedy” first depends upon 
the definition of “success.”  In the context of an exclusionary remedy, the Court 
generally recognizes deterring illegal police conduct as the only valid 
justification.117  Assuming that deterring the NSA from engaging in flagrantly 
illegal surveillance is the goal of the statutory exclusionary remedy, then this 
proposal would be effective only if excluding subsequently derived evidence 
provided enough disincentive for the NSA to terminate the illegal surveillance.  If 
the NSA does not care whether the indirect fruits of its illegal surveillance can be 
used in court, if it is not relying on judicial process to deal with the suspects that it 
reveals (if instead the NSA is intending, for example, to subject the suspects 
identified to extra-judicial procedures), then a stronger, statutory exclusionary rule 
will not prevent the illegal conduct. 
It seems likely that a wide-scale program of illegal surveillance would 
generate a large list of domestic suspects, too large for the NSA to seize and 
detain.  It is unlikely that a surreptitiously seized phone or e-mail conversation 
would say, “I am looking to blow up a federal building.  How much and what kind 
                                                                                                                                          
115 See Roger S. Ruffin, Out on a Limb of the Poisonous Tree: The Tainted Witness, 15 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 32 (1967) (explaining how giving Miranda warnings to an accused or another 
witness relates to the attenuation of some prior police misconduct). 
116 See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (discussed supra text accompanying note 
94).  
117 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984) (“[T]he exclusionary rule is designed 
to deter police misconduct . . . .”); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (“[T]he rule's prime 
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of explosives will I need?”  As wiretapping other types of illicit conduct has 
shown, individuals contemplating acts of illegality cloak their plans behind code 
words and veiled language.118  As a practical matter, therefore, the NSA would 
need the subsequent, legal investigation, at least in most cases, to winnow its 
suspects from plausible to likely guilty.  Even today, not all investigation can be 
done from a computer.  If nothing else, the difference between the number of anti-
terrorism field agents that the FBI and the NSA can deploy domestically would 
seem to necessitate the involvement of the second, post-firewall agency. 
In addition, the selection of the NSA in the thought experiment is hypothetical 
(at least, the author hopes so).  The more salient point is that, under current 
attenuation doctrine, any two law-enforcement agencies, or even two divisions 
within one agency, could engage in the two-step investigation, as long as they were 
sufficiently separated by a firewall.  In other words, the FBI (or a local police 
department) could launch some bureaucratically titled “Non-Evidentiary 
Investigation Unit” within itself and, as long as all that unit shared with the team 
investigating criminal charges was the suspect’s name, the subsequent 
investigation by the “court unit” would be an independent source for the evidence 
at trial.  So, the firewall-loophole problem is not dependent on the involvement of 
a foreign-intelligence agency like the NSA that may not care about conventional 
prosecution. 
Finally, even preventive-detention procedures, like those that the Court has 
historically approved, require Congressional authorization119 and some level of 
individualized proof of guilt.120  Assuming that the Congressional intent behind a 
legislative remedy for illegal surveillance that does not result in trial evidence is to 
deter the illegal surveillance in the first instance, Congress could enact an 
exclusionary rule that governed extrajudicial determinations, as well. 
As I previously explained: 
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(denying German combatants tried by a military tribunal the constitutional right to habeas corpus); 
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120 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that trying Hamdan by military 
tribunal violated the Geneva Convention); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that the 
preventive detention of Americans without review of the factual basis for detention in a neutral forum 
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“The police have always been able to surveil anyone and collect 
evidence that they have abandoned or left in plain view. . . . Because of 
resource constraints, however, they would only surveil people against 
whom they had some individualized suspicion in the first instance—
people who were already suspects.  The police of the past were never 
able to surveil everyone.  But today, they both can and do surveil people 
prior to suspicion as a way of looking for suspects.”121 
 
Because of the firewall loophole created by the attenuation doctrine and the 
“identity” cases, as long as surveillance that identifies a suspect is not employed at 




While Americans are often willing to trade freedom and privacy for security, 
in the case of the mass surveillance revealed by Snowden, they have shown interest 
in, and expressed outrage over, the programs.122  The convergence of the two 
phenomena identified in this Article—the unwillingness of the Court to adopt a 
stricter attenuation doctrine and the popular resistance to high-tech bulk 
surveillance—may create an opportunity for Congress to take the lead in protecting 
privacy, rather than relying upon constitutional adjudication by the courts. 
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